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The relationship between growth and income inequality has occupied the attention of the 
profession for some 50 years, since the appearance of Kuznets (1955) pioneering work, and is both 
important and controversial.  Its controversy derives from the fact that it has been difficult to 
reconcile the different theories, especially since the empirical evidence has been inconclusive.   
As detailed by Lundberg and Squire (2003), the empirical literature has tended to evolve in 
one of two directions.  One line of research follows the tradition of Kuznets, and has tested the 
hypothesis that inequality is an inverse-U shaped function of the level of output, with ambiguous 
results; see Anand and Kanbur (1993).  At issue here is whether more inequality enhances or inhibits 
the growth rate.  This has been addressed by running regressions of growth rates on measures of 
inequality and examining the signs of the relevant regression coefficients.  Early tests of this 
hypothesis by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), and others 
obtain a negative relationship.  The various explanations for this include: the political economy 
consequences of inequality (Alesina and Rodrik), the fact that inequality may harm investment in 
physical or human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997), and the unequal 
distribution of natural resources (Gylfason and Zoega, 2003).  Other studies find a positive, or at 
least more ambiguous, relationship; see e.g.  Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), and Barro (2000).  In 
particular, Forbes finds a positive relationship when the short-term impact is considered.  Barro finds 
a negative relationship between inequality and growth for poorer countries, but a positive 
relationship in the case of richer countries.  Explanations for the positive relationship include: a 
positive relationship between inequality and higher tax rates to finance public education and human 
capital formation (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993), the role of socio-economic stratification (Bénabou, 
1996a), and the nature of technological progress (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). 
The alternative approach involves examining the determinants of growth and inequality as 
essentially interdependent processes.  Lundberg and Squire (2003) introduce a number of factors that 
may potentially influence both inequality and growth and test for their joint significance.  They 
  1identify two factors that are likely to impact both variables in the same direction, thereby implying a 
positive relationship between income inequality and growth.
1
Despite the controversy, one thing is clear.  An economy’s growth rate and its income 
distribution are both endogenous outcomes of the economic system.  They are therefore subject to 
common influences, both with respect to structural changes as well as macroeconomic policies.  
Structural changes that affect the rewards to different factors will almost certainly affect agents 
differentially, thereby influencing the distribution of income.  Likewise, policies aimed at achieving 
distributional objectives are likely to impact the aggregate economy’s productive performance.   
Being between endogenous variables, the income inequality-growth relationship – whether positive 
or negative – will reflect the underlying common forces to which they are both reacting, and this can 
be understood only within the context of a consistently specified general equilibrium growth model. 
  The purpose of this paper is to develop a small canonical growth model in which the growth 
rate and income inequality are jointly determined.  The framework we adopt is an extension of 
Romer’s (1986) endogenous growth model with endogenous labor supply, with the heterogeneity of 
the agents, which is the source of the income inequality, stemming from their initial distribution of 
capital endowments.  The key mechanism generating the endogenous distribution of income is the 
positive equilibrium relationship we derive between agents’ relative wealth (capital) and their 
relative allocation of time between work and leisure.  This relationship is very basic and has a simple 
intuition.  Wealthier agents have a lower marginal utility of wealth.  They therefore choose to 
increase consumption of all goods including leisure, and reduce their labor supply.  Given their 
relative capital endowments, this translates to an endogenously determined distribution of income.   
Indeed, the role played by labor supply in this model is analogous to its role in other models 
of capital accumulation and growth, where it provides the crucial mechanism by which demand 
shocks influence the rate of capital accumulation.  For example, in the standard Ramsey model, 
government consumption expenditure will generate capital accumulation if and only if labor is 
supplied elastically.  With inelastic labor supply it will simply crowd out an equivalent amount of 
private consumption. The key factor is the wealth effect and the impact this has on the labor-leisure 
                                                 
1 The two factors they identify are measures of civil liberty and openness. 
  2choice.  This mechanism is also central to empirical models of labor supply based on intertemporal 
optimization; see e.g. MaCurdy (1981).   
There is substantial empirical evidence documenting the negative relationship between 
wealth and labor supply.  Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) find evidence to support the 
view that large inheritances decrease labor participation.  Cheng and French (2000) and Coronado 
and Perozek (2003) use data from the stock market boom of the 1990s to study the effects of wealth 
on labor supply and retirement, finding a substantial negative effect on labor participation.  Algan, 
Chéron, Hairault, and Langot (2003) use French data to analyze the effect of wealth on labor market 
transitions, and find a significant wealth effect on the extensive margin of labor supply.  Overall, 
these studies and others provide compelling evidence in support of the wealth-leisure mechanism 
being emphasized in this paper. 
An attractive feature of the Romer (1986) model for our purposes is that this crucial labor 
supply function turns out to be linear in the agents’ capital endowments.  This makes the aggregation 
from individuals to the aggregate – critical to the study of income distribution within a consistently 
derived macro equilibrium – surprisingly tractable.  Indeed, we are able to represent the 
macroeconomic equilibrium in terms of a simple recursive structure.  First the equilibrium mean 
growth rate and labor supply are jointly determined to ensure that rates of return are in equilibrium 
and that the product market clears.  The equilibrium values of these two variables are not affected by 
the distribution of wealth. Second, given the initial distribution of capital among agents, the 
equilibrium labor supply determines the degree of income inequality.   
Using this framework, we analyze the joint determination of the growth rate and income 
inequality and consider how this responds to various structural changes pertaining to such things as 
the rate of time preference, productivity, and risk.  On balance, our results tend to support the view 
that growth-enhancing structural changes are likely to be associated with higher income equality, 
consistent with the recent empirical findings of Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000) and Lundberg and 
Squire (2003).   
We should also emphasize at the outset that by adapting the Romer model, we are ignoring 
other important elements central to the growth-income inequality relationship, most notably human 
  3capital and education.  This aspect is emphasized by Galor and Zeira (1993), Bénabou (1996b), and 
Viaene and Zilcha (2003), among others.  By identifying agents’ heterogeneity with their initial 
physical capital endowments, we are embedding distributional issues within a more traditional 
growth-theoretic framework.  Indeed, the role of the return to capital, which is essential in that 
literature, has largely been ignored in the recent discussions of income inequality.  The argument 
that the return to capital is essential to understanding distributional differences has, however, been 
emphasized by Atkinson (2003), and is supported by recent empirical evidence for the OECD (see 
Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2005). 
There is a substantial recent literature investigating the relationship between income 
distribution and growth.  Of this literature, our paper is related to Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Bertola (1993), who develop AK growth models in which agents 
differ in their initial stocks of capital.
 2 The first two papers have, however, a very different focus as 
they take initial inequality as given and argue that it has a negative impact on the rate of growth.  In 
contrast to their results, this paper emphasizes that growth and distribution are jointly determined, 
and presents a possible mechanism that generates a positive relationship between these two variables 
in line with the evidence presented by Forbes (2000).  Bertola (1993) is closer to our approach in 
that he emphasizes how technological parameters, specifically the productivity of capital, jointly 
determine distribution and growth. He also examines how policies directed at increasing the growth 
rate affect the distribution of consumption, although his assumption of a constant labor supply 
implies that the distribution of income is independent of policy choices.  Our approach shares with 
these three papers an important limitation, namely, that the assumption that agents differ only in 
their initial stocks of capital coupled with an AK technology implies that there are no income 
dynamics.
3  Finally, this paper shares a common feature with Viane and Zilcha (2003) in the sense 
that both relate the growth-inequality relationship to underlying structural characteristics, in a 
general equilibrium context, albeit a somewhat different one. 
                                                 
2 See, among others, Aghion and Bolton (1997) and, as well as the overview in Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa 
(1999).  
3 A more general study of heterogeneity and the dynamics of distribution in growth models can be found in Caselli and 
Ventura (2000). 
 
  4The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the structure of the model and 
derive the macroeconomic equilibrium.  Section 4 examines the determinants of the distribution of 
income and Section 5 analyzes the relationship between growth and inequality in response to 
specified structural changes.  Section 6 supplements our theoretical analysis with some numerical 
simulations. Section 7 concludes, while technical details are provided in the Appendix.  
2.   The model 
2.1  Description of the decentralized economy 
Technology and factor payments 
Firms shall be indexed by j.  We assume that the representative firm produces output in 
accordance with the production function 
( , ) j j YF L K K = j          ( 1 a )    
where Kj denotes the individual firm’s capital stock, Lj denotes the individual firm’s employment of 
labor,  K is the average stock of capital in the economy, a proxy for the economy-wide stock of 
knowledge, so that LjK measures the efficiency units of labor employed by the firm.  Production has 
the usual neoclassical properties of positive but diminishing marginal physical products and constant 
returns to scale in private capital,  j K , and in labor measured in efficiency units, LjK.  This means 
that the production function has constant returns to scale both in the accumulating factors,  j K  and 
K , necessary for endogenous growth, and in the private factors  j K  and  j L , necessary for marginal 
product factor pricing to be consistent with a competitive equilibrium. 
All firms face identical production conditions.  Hence they will all choose the same level of 
employment and capital stock. That is, K j = K and L j = L for all j, where   is the average 
economy-wide level of employment.  The economy-wide capital stock yields an externality such that 
in equilibrium the aggregate (average) production function is linear in the aggregate capital stock, as 
in Romer (1986), namely
L
4
                                                 
4 We assume that the production function satisfies the Inada conditions  ( 0 )0 ,( 0 ) ,( ) 0 ff f ′ ′ = →∞ ∞ →  
  5() ,( YF L K K f L K == )   () 0 ,  () 0 fL fL ′ ′′ ><     (1b)   
  We assume that the wage rate and the return to capital are determined by their respective 
marginal physical products.  Differentiating the production function and given that firms are 
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implying that the equilibrium return to capital is independent of the stock of capital while the wage 
rate is proportional to the average stock of capital, and therefore grows with the economy.
5  In 
addition, we have   and  /( rL L fL ′′ ∂∂ = − > ) 0 0 /( ) wLfL K ′′ ∂ ∂= <, reflecting the fact that more 
employment raises the productivity of capital but lowers that of labor.
 
Consumers 
There is a mass 1 of infinitely-lived agents in the economy.  Consumers are indexed by i and 
are identical in all respects except for their initial endowment of capital, Ki0. Since the economy is 
growing, we are interested in the share of individual i in the total stock of capital, ki, defined as 
ii kK K ≡ .  Relative capital has a distribution function  , mean   ( ) i Gk 1 i ik = ∑ , and variance 
2
k σ .  
All agents are endowed with a unit of time that can be allocated either to leisure,   or to 
work,  .  A typical consumer maximizes expected lifetime utility, assumed to be a function 
of both consumption and the amount of leisure time, in accordance with the isoelastic utility function 
li




max ( ) ,    with   1, 0,1> (1 ) 
t
ii Ct l e d t
γ ηβ γ ηγ
γ
∞ − −∞< < > + ∫ η    (3) 
where  1( 1 ) e γ ≡−  equals the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
6  The overwhelming 
preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that this is relatively small, certainly well below unity, 
                                                 
5 Intuitively, in a growing economy, with the labor supply fixed, the higher income earned by labor is reflected in higher 
returns, whereas with capital growing at the same rate as output, returns to capital remain constant. 
6 The parameter restrictions in (3) are introduced to ensure concavity of the utility function. 
  6so that we shall assume γ < 0.  The parameter η represents the elasticity of leisure in utility.  This 
maximization is subject to the agent’s capital accumulation constraint 
(1 ) ii i i K rK l wK C =+ − −          ( 4 )  
With the equilibrium wage rate being tied to the aggregate capital stock, we observe from (4) that the 
individual’s rate of capital accumulation depends on the aggregate stock of capital, which the 
individual takes as given.  For expositional simplicity we abstract from the government. 
2.2  Consumer optimization  
The consumer’s formal optimization problem is to choose her rate of consumption, leisure, 
and rate of capital accumulation to maximize (3) subject to the accumulation equation (4).  The 
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ii i Cl w K
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where  i λ  is agent i’s shadow value of capital, together with the transversality condition 






These optimality conditions are standard.  In equations (1) and (2) we have defined w, r, and f.  
There we have expressed them as functions of equilibrium employment,  , but assuming that the 
aggregate labor market clears, yields 
L
     1( 1 ) j i ji L Ll l = =−= − ∑∑       ( 6 )  
and we can equally well write them as functions of (1− l), namely 
  ,  () ( ) ( 1 ) wl f L f l ′′ ≡≡ − ( ) () () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) rl f L L f L f l l f l ′ ′ ≡ −≡ − − − −    (7) 
  7implying (1 .  ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) l w l r lflf L −+ = − ≡
2.3  Derivation of macroeconomic equilibrium 
From the optimality conditions, together with the individual’s accumulation equation, and the 
corresponding conditions for the aggregate economy, we shall derive the macroeconomic 
equilibrium, showing that the economy is in fact always on its balanced growth path.  We begin by 
dividing (5b) by (5a) to obtain 







η =         ( 8 )  
while we may write the individual’s accumulation equation (4) in the form 
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Taking the time derivative of (5a) and combining with (5c) implies 











)  for  each  i      (10) 
The important point about (10) is that each agent, irrespective of her capital endowment, chooses the 
same growth rate for her shadow value of capital.  Taking the time derivative of (8) implies 
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Now consider equations (10) and (11) for individuals i and k.  We obtain 





















  8from which we infer 









 for  all  i, k      ( 1 2 )  
That is, all agents will choose the same growth rate for consumption and leisure. 
  Now turn to the aggregates.  Summing (8) over all agents and noting that  ,  ki i ∑ =1 li i ∑ = l, 
the aggregate economy-wide consumption-capital ratio is 




η =          ( 8 ’ )  
while summing over (9) yields the aggregate accumulation equation  
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In addition, (12) implies that average consumption, C, and leisure, l, also grow at their respective 
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The remainder of our derivation is to show that in equilibrium  () , () , () () () ii i lt l t k t K t Kt ≡  
are constant through time, so that the economy is in fact always on its balanced growth path, just as 
it is with identical agents; see Turnovsky (2000).  To show this, substitute (9’), (11), and (12) into 
(10) expressing it by the following differential equation in l: 
        
() ()
()
dl t G l
dt H l
=        ( 1 3 )  
where   
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  9Because time is bounded, in steady-state equilibrium  0 l =  , with the corresponding stationary level 
of l being determined where  () 0 Gl = .  Thus the linearized dynamics of l about that point are 
represented by 








= −      (14) 
In the Appendix we show that under the conditions we have imposed,  () 0 Gl ′ > , in which case (14) 
is an unstable differential equation.  The only solution consistent with the eventual attainment of 
steady state is for   to be constant at all points of time. () lt
7  It then follows from (12’) that   is 
also constant over time. 
( ) i lt
  The next step is to combine (9) and (9’) to obtain the following differential equation in the 
relative capital stock,  () () () ii kt Kt Kt ≡ , namely 
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i ⎥       ( 1 5 )  
This equation describes the potential evolution of the relative wealth (capital), starting from the 
initial endowment  .  With   both constants this is a simple linear equation, the properties of 
which will depend the coefficient of  , which we can determine from the transversality 
condition.  If (5d) holds for all individuals it implies the aggregate condition  
0 k ,  i ll
( ) i kt






With  l  constant, (9’) and (10) imply that λ  and K  both grow at constant rates.  It is then 
straightforward to show that (5d’) will be met if and only if  
    r ψ >          ( 1 6 )  
i.e. the equilibrium rate of return on capital must exceed the equilibrium growth rate.  It then follows 
from the two equations in (9’) that the transversality condition can be further written in the following 
                                                 
7 For more general production structures, particular involving two-sector economies, it is possible that (14) is unstable, 
giving rise to potential problems of indeterminate equilibria.   
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.        (17b) 
The first equation asserts that part of the agent’s capital income is consumed, while the latter 
imposes the restriction on leisure that ensures that this will be the case. 
  Now returning to (15) we see from (17b) that the coefficient of   is positive implying that 
the only solution consistent with long-run stability and the transversality condition is that the right 
hand side of (15) be zero, so that 
i k
0 i k =   for all time.  Since   reflects capital stocks that evolve 
gradually over time, this is accomplished by agents selecting their respective leisure,  , in 
accordance with the “relative labor supply” function 
i k
i l
     ( 1
1




−= − − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
) i       ( 1 8 )  
Thus the transversality condition (17b) yields a positive relationship between relative wealth and 
leisure, such that the relative wealth position of agents,  , is unchanging over time.  The capital 
stock of all agents grows at the same rate, implying that at any point in time, the share of agent i,  , 
remains equal to her initial share  , say.  Moreover, it follows from (10), (11), and (12) that 
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       ( 1 9 )  
  The relationship (18) is the crucial mechanism whereby the agent’s initial relative 
endowment of capital impacts on the distribution of income.  Wealthier agents have a lower 
marginal utility of wealth.  They therefore choose to supply less labor and to “buy” more leisure.  In 
effect, they compensate for their larger capital endowment, and the higher growth rate it would 
support, by providing less labor, thereby having an exactly offsetting effect on the growth rate, 
                                                 
8In the absence of labor income, this latter condition reduces to the well known conditionCK> 0 . 
  11which is therefore independent of the distribution of capital.   
The role that the elasticity of labor supply is playing in the determination of income 
distribution is analogous to that it plays in other similar growth models.  For example, government 
consumption expenditure will have capital accumulation effects in the Ramsey model, and growth 
effects in the Romer model if and only if labor is supplied elastically.  In both cases it is the wealth 
effect and its impact on labor supply that is driving the underlying responses.  
3.  Macroeconomic equilibrium   
The above argument implies that the economy is always on its balanced growth path, the key 
equilibrium relationships of which can be summarized by  








         ( 2 0 a )  
Individual consumption-capital ratio 
i
ii
C w i l
K k η
=          (20b) 




=          ( 2 0 c )  
Individual Budget Constraint 








=+ −         (20d) 





ψ =−          ( 2 0 e )  
Recalling the definitions of  ,  , and  ) (l r ) (l w Ω(l), and given  , these equations jointly  ki
  12determine the individual and aggregate consumption-capital ratios,  ii CK , CK, the individual and 
aggregate leisure times,  ,  , and the average (common) growth rate,  li l ψ . 
Using (20a), (20c), and (20e), the macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy can be 
summarized by the following pair of equations that jointly determine the equilibrium mean growth 
rate, ψ , and average leisure time,  :  l
RR    
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
fl l f l β
ψ
γ
′ − −− −−
=
−
,     (21a) 







=− − .      (21b) 
The first equation describes the relationship between ψ  and l that ensures the equality 
between the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital and return to consumption. The second describes 
the combinations of the mean growth and leisure that ensure product market equilibrium holds.  We 
shall focus our attention on solutions that are not only viable, in the sense of satisfying the 
transversality condition, but also generate positive equilibrium growth.  From (21b) and (17b), the 








        ( 2 2 )  
where  () () W sf L L f L ′ ≡  is the share of output accruing to labor.  For the Cobb-Douglas production 
function,   is just constant.  W s
These RR and PP locuses are depicted in Figure 1, and their formal properties are discussed 
in the Appendix.  First, note that equation PP is always decreasing in l, reflecting the fact that more 
leisure time reduces output, thus increasing the consumption-output ratio and having an adverse 
effect on the growth rate of capital.  In addition, the RR curve is also decreasing in l.  Intuitively, a 
higher fraction of time devoted to leisure reduces the productivity of capital, requiring a fall in the 
return to consumption. This is obtained if the growth of the marginal utility of consumption rises, 
that is, if the balanced growth rate falls.  Under weak conditions, both schedules are concave, and 
sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium exists to exist are  
  13   (1) (1) 0 ff γ β ′ −++ > ,            (23)   
together with the stability condition,  () 0 Gl ′ > , both of which are certainly met if  0 γ ≤ , and hold 
under much weaker conditions as well. 
4.  The distribution of income and welfare 
We now consider the relative income of an individual having capital stock  .  Her gross 
income is simply  , while average economy-wide income is  .  
Using equation (18) to substitute for the individual’s labor supply, we can write the relative income 
of individual i, 
i K
(1 ) ii Yr Kw K l =+ − i (1 ) Yr Kw K l =+ −
ii yY Y ≡ , as 
) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( '
) 1 (
) 1 (













    (24) 
which we may express more compactly as: 
(1 )
(, ) 1 (, ) ( 1 ) ,   w h e r e     () 1
(1 ) (1 )
ii i
fl







,   (24’) 
  Equation (24’) emphasizes that the distribution of income depends upon two factors, the 
initial (unchanging) distribution of capital, and the equilibrium allocation of time between labor and 
leisure, insofar as this determines factor rewards.  The net effect of an increase in initial wealth on 
the relative income of agent i is given by ρ(l).  As long as the equilibrium is one of positive growth, 
it is straightforward to show that
9
    0( , ) l 1 ρ η <<         ( 2 5 )  
Thus relative income is strictly increasing in  , indicating that although richer individuals choose a 
lower supply of labor, this effect is insufficiently strong to offset the impact of their higher capital 
income.  Consequently, the standard deviation of income across the agents, 
ki
σy, which provides a 
                                                 
9Writing  () () () () ( ) ( ) (, ) 1 ( 1 lf f l ff l ρη η η η η ⎡ ′′ =− + − + ⎣⎤ ⎦ , if the equilibrium is one of positive growth, (21b) 
implies that the first term in brackets is positive, while the transversality condition (17b) implies that the send term is 
positive, thus ensuring that  (, ) 0 l ρ η > .  The fact that  (, ) 1 l ρ η <  is immediate from its definition.   
  14convenient measure of income inequality, is less than their (unchanging) variability of capital, σk. 
To see this more intuitively, note that the relative labor supply function, equation (18), implies that 
the standard deviation of labor supplies,  Ll σ σ = , can be expressed as 












.          ( 1 8 ’ )  
From (22) the term in brackets in (18’) lies between 0 and 1, indicating that labor supplies are less 
unequally distributed than are capital endowments, thus reducing the variability of income relative to 
that of capital.  
  The second point to note is that we can rank different outcomes according to inequality 
without needing any information about the underlying distribution of capital. For a given distribution 
of capital, structural or policy changes affect the distribution of income solely through their impact 
on relative prices, as captured by  ) (l ρ .  Correia (1999) has shown that when agents differ only in 
their endowment of one good, there exists an ordering of outcomes by income inequality, as 
measured by second-order stochastic dominance.
10  That ordering is determined by equilibrium 
prices, and is independent of the distribution of endowments.  
  The DD locus in the lower panel of Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between the standard 
deviation of relative income, σy, our measure of income inequality, and the standard deviation of 
capital endowments, σk, namely 
  DD   (, ) y l k σ ρη σ =       ( 2 1 c )  
Given the standard deviation of capital, σk, the standard deviation of income is a decreasing and 
concave function of aggregate leisure time. This is because as leisure increases (and labor supply 
declines) the wage rate rises and the return to capital falls, compressing the range of income flows 
between the wealthy with large endowments of capital and the less well endowed.  Thus, having 
determined the equilibrium allocation of labor from the upper panels in Fig. 1, (21c) determines the 
corresponding unique variability of income across agents.  We may summarize the properties of 
                                                 
10 Her results also require that the economy be amenable to Gorman aggregation, which is the case in our setup. 
  15equilibrium income distribution in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1:   
(i)  The degree of income inequality is less than the degree of wealth inequality. 
(ii)  The ratio of an agent’s deviation in income from its mean,  , to her 
corresponding deviation in capital, 
1 i y −
1 i k − , is identical across all agents.   
Furthermore, in a growing economy, agents having an above average 
endowment of capital have an above average level of income and vice versa. 
(iii)  Given the initial distribution of capital across agents, structural changes and 
policy responses influence the distribution of income through their effect on 
labor supply.  However, changes in the structural parameter, η, have an 
additional direct distributional effect.  
Proposition 1 highlights the central role played by the labor supply in determining the 
distribution of income. In fact from equation (24) we can see that inequality depends, on the 
one hand, on the labor share which determines the relative rewards of capital and labor, and 
on the other, on the elasticity of the labor supply which determines the dispersion of 
individual labor supplies. A policy maker could then eliminate all income dispersion by 
setting  (1 ) ff η ′ =+  in (24’), thus driving the wage share to  (1 )(1 ) W sl η = +− .  However, 
this is associated with a negative equilibrium growth rate.
11
5.  The relationship between inequality and growth 
As emphasized at the outset, and as our analysis has illustrated, inequality and growth are 
jointly determined.  We now use Fig 1 to explore the relationship in response to two structural 
shocks: (i) an increase in savings, generated by a reduction in the rate of time discount, β , and (ii) 
                                                 
f
11This can be easily shown by substituting  (1 ) f η ′ = +  into (21b) and recalling the transversality condition.  Note that 
the transversality condition ensures  , so that eliminating all income dispersion is indeed feasible. See García-
Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2004) for an analysis of the policy implications of this model. 
1 W s <
  16an increase in productivity.   
5.1   Decrease in rate of time preference, β  
This is illustrated in Fig. 2.  The intersection of the PP and RR curves at Q determines the 
initial equilibrium fraction of time devoted to leisure, l , and the corresponding growth rate, ψ .  
Given  l , the corresponding point M on the DD curves determines the corresponding degree of 
income inequality,  y σ .  A decrease in β  shifts the RR curve upward, to R’R’, with PP and DD 
remaining unchanged.  As a result, the new equilibrium shifts to Q’ and M’, with a higher growth 
rate, less leisure, and a greater income inequality.  
  The intuition for this response is straightforward.  Given labor supply, the decline in 
impatience associated with the lower rate of time preference leads to an increase in savings and an 
immediate increase in the growth rate.  This is represented by the move from Q to S on R’R.  But the 
higher growth rate implies higher future wages, and hence higher consumption for any extra time 
spent at work. It therefore reduces leisure, increasing the supply of labor, raising the return to capital 
and causing a further increase in the growth rate, as measured by the move SQ’ along the R’R curve.  
The reallocation of time in turn, affects the distribution of income.  The increase in labor supply 
raises the return to capital and decreases that to labor.  Since labor is more equally distributed than 
capital, the income gap between any two individuals rises and income inequality increases.   
5.2   Increase in productivity 
  We assume that level of productivity is represented by a shift parameter, A, in the production 
function, so that the aggregate production function is now represented by  .  From Fig. 3 
we see that an increase in A leads to an upward shift in both the RR and PP curves, the latter rotating 
about the point T, with the equilibrium shifting from Q and M, to Q’ and M’, respectively.  The 
upward shift in the RR curve has the effects described above, and the same intuition applies.   
However, the upward shift in the PP curve (for 
() YA f L K =
0 ψ > ) has offsetting effects, causing an increase in l 
accompanied by a lower growth rate, ψ .  On impact, given labor supply and output, this raises the 
growth rate and the return on consumption, causing agents to increase consumption and leisure over 
  17work.  This causes a reduction in output and the growth rate, leading to a reduction to the return to 
capital and consumption. On balance the former effect can be shown to dominate and the new 
equilibrium at Q’ is associated with a higher growth rate and less leisure, and therefore greater 
income inequality.
12
We may therefore summarize these results with the following: 
Proposition 2: 
A decrease in the rate of time preference, or an increase in productivity, induces a 
positive relationship between growth and income inequality.   
  Two points should be noted.  First, the elasticity of labor supply is critical to these 
relationships.  If labor were inelastically supplied at  1 l = , say, the relative income of agent i would 
be  yi = (w + rki)/(w +r).  In this case the AK technology results in a constant wage and interest 
rate, so that this expression would be unaffected by these structural changes.  In our setup they 
matter because they affect the growth rate, and this, in turn, impacts labor supply and factor rewards. 
Second, it is evident from Figure 1 that with both RR and PP being negatively sloped, any 
structural or policy change that induces a shift in only one of these curves always generates a 
negative relationship between growth and leisure.  If further, the DD curve remains unchanged, this 
translates into a positive relationship between growth and income inequality.  The decrease in β  is 
one example of this and a change in γ  is another.   
6. Numerical  examples 
To obtain further insights into the growth-income inequality relationship we provide some 
numerical examples.  To do so, we employ the aggregate equilibrium Cobb-Douglas production 
function, YA , and use the following, mostly conventional, parameter values:  L K
α =
                                                 
12 This can be easily established by taking the differentials of the equilibrium relationships (22a) –(22c), the details of 
which are omitted. 
  18Parameter Values 
 
Production   60 . 0     , 60 . 0 = = α A  
Preferences  β = 0.04, γ =−2, η =1.75 
The choice of production elasticity of labor measured in efficiency units implies that 60% of output 
accrues to labor.  The rate of time preference of 4% is commonly used in calibrations for the US 
economy, while the choice of the elasticity on leisure, η =1.75, is standard in the real business cycle 
literature, implying that about 72% of time is devoted to leisure, consistent with empirical evidence.  
Estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) are more variable throughout the 
literature.  With few exceptions they lie in the range (0,1). Our choice of 1/3 is in line with early 
estimates based on consumption. However, more recent empirical evidence, based on stock market 
data, suggests that it is substantially higher, perhaps 2/3 or even higher,
13 and alternative values will 
be used. The choice of the scale parameter A = 0.60, is set to yield a plausible value for the 
equilibrium capital-output ratio.   
Our numerical measures of inequality are the standard deviation of income employed in our 
theoretical discussion,  as well as the more standard Gini coefficient.  This involves choosing an 
initial distribution of wealth, which is less straightforward, as data on the distribution of wealth are 
difficult to obtain.
14  The choice we have made yields a Gini coefficient of almost 33%, which 
compares with 37.8% and 32.52% for the US and Sweden in 1990, respectively.
15  
The first line of Table 1 reports the benchmark equilibrium for our base parameters.  It 
indicates that 72.7% of time is allocated to leisure, yielding a growth rate of 2.3%. The standard 
deviation of income inequality is 0.199 times the standard deviation of the distribution of wealth, 
and the Gini coefficient is 32.88, as noted.  This is a plausible benchmark and l=0.727  lies in the 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), and the discussion in Guvenen, 
(2003).  
14 We have assumed that the distribution of wealth among the 5 quintiles is 0, 0, 1.2%, 12%, 86.8%, which are consistent 
with the data.  For example, in the US in 1992 the bottom 40% of the population held 0.4% of total wealth, while the top 
20% owed 83.8% of the total; see Wolff (1998). Since we have no heterogeneity in wages, we also suppose that the 
bottom quintile has no labor income. 
15 These and all subsequent data on income inequality are from Brandolini (2003).   
  19range [0.636, 0.745], consistent with the constraints in (22).   
The next four lines in Table 1 report, sequentially, the effect of a 50 per cent increase in the 
main parameters of the model: the level of technology, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
the rate of time preference, and the elasticity of labor. These exercises show that the predictions of 
the model are roughly in line with a number of stylized facts concerning income inequality in OECD 
countries. Furthermore, the size of the effects reported can, in some cases, explain a substantial 
fraction of cross-country disparities. 
6.1 Increase  in  productivity 
Consider first an increase in A of 50%, from 0.6 to 0.9. Assuming a 2% annual rate of 
productivity growth, such an increase in A approximates the accumulated increase in productivity 
over a 20 year period. We see that it enhances the growth rate by 1.877 points, raising the Gini 
coefficient by 0.64 points. This mechanism could partly explain the recent increase in income 
inequality in the US. Between 1975 and 1995 the Gini coefficient in the US increased by 6.4 Gini 
points. The period also witnessed the widespread adoption of IT technologies. It has been argued 
that the resulting productivity increase led to greater wage inequality, and hence greater income 
inequality.
16 Our analysis implies that an increase in the technology parameter would also impact the 
distribution of income through its effect on the returns to capital and labor. This effect is significant, 
accounting for 10 per cent of the overall change during these two decades. 
6.2  Increase in intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
The data on inequality consistently show that incomes are more unequally distributed in the 
US than in other OECD countries. For example, in 1984, the Gini coefficient in the US was 36.90, 
while those of France, Italy, and Germany were 34.91, 33.15, and 32.20, respectively.
17  That is, 
inequality in these countries was between 2 and 4.6 Gini points lower than in the US.  One possible 
explanation for the high degree of inequality observed in the US is a larger intertemporal elasticity of 
                                                 
16 See Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999). 
17 This is the most recent year for which comparable data for these countries and Japan is available.  
  20substitution (IES).  As noted by Guvenen (2003), empirical microeconomic studies suggests that the 
IES increases with wealth, and with stock-ownership being more widespread in the US, one can 
reasonably conclude that the IES is correspondingly larger than in many OECD countries.  The third 
row in Table 1 shows that an increase in the IES from 1/3 to 1/2 results in a 1.7 point increase in 
inequality.  Indeed, a modest difference in the IES thus accounts for a substantial fraction of the 
difference in income inequality.   
But even within the US, it is widely agreed that wealth holdings have increased over time, 
suggesting that the IES has increased over time as well.  From this standpoint, row 3 in Table 1 
suggests that a modest increase in the IES over time can account for a significant fraction of the 
increase in income inequality that has been occurring in the US during recent years.   
6.3  Increase in preference for leisure 
An alternative reason for the observed disparities between the US and Europe may be a 
difference in the preference for leisure.  Annual working hours are substantially lower in most 
European countries than in the US.  For example, in 2002, American workers spent 1,815 hours at 
work, while those in France and Germany worked for under just 1,500 hours (OECD, 2004). A 
possible cause of this difference is that Europeans have a greater desire for leisure. Our third 
exercise consists in increasing η by 50%, from 1.75 to 2.625.  The effect is to increase dramatically 
the fraction of time devoted to leisure, from  0.727 to 0.802 (i.e. a 27% reduction in working time). 
Our model suggests that this difference in preferences leads to a growth rate that is about 0.6 
percentage points lower, and a Gini coefficient almost 2.2 points smaller. This indicates that 
differences in the elasticity of labor supply could account for a large fraction of the observed 2 to 5 
point difference in Gini coefficients between the US and continental Europe. 
6.4  Decrease in rate of time preference 
Finally, we consider a comparable (percentage-wise) decrease in the rate of time preference.  
A reduction of 50% has a relatively smaller effect on the growth rate and relatively larger effect on 
inequality, raising the Gini coefficient by almost 1 point.  This may help account for the rather high 
  21inequality observed in Japan (Gini coefficient of 35.41 in 1984), a country with a high savings rate, 
which is often argued to be the result of a lower rate of time preference.  
Table 1 also sheds light on the varied empirical evidence on the relationship between 
inequality and growth.  In the table, we have reported  ψ ρ d d / .  This is always positive indicating 
the positive relationship between growth and inequality.  Note, however, the sharp differences in the 
slopes of the tradeoffs.  A productivity increase has a relatively smaller effect on inequality, for a 
given increase in the growth rate, whereas the preference in leisure has the greatest effect, about 10 
times as much.  The slopes  ψ ρ d d /  for a change in β  and a change in the IES are approximately 
the same.
18  We can think of A as a productivity parameter that varies over time within the same 
country, while the preference parameters are viewed as constant over time for a particular economy. 
These results then can explain why fixed-effects estimations of the relationship between inequality 
and growth, which only estimate changes over time within a country, find a much weaker correlation 
between these two variables than do studies in which the cross-country correlation is examined (see 
Forbes, 2000, and Barro, 2000, respectively).  
7. Concluding  comments 
The relationship between growth and inequality remains largely unresolved, despite the 
intensive research devoted to it over the past 50 years.  Empirical evidence is inconclusive, some 
authors finding these two variables to be negatively related, while others obtain a positive 
relationship; see Lundberg and Squire (2003).  Indeed, the ambiguity of the empirical findings 
should not be too surprising when one considers that both variables are endogenous, so that their co-
movements are likely to depend upon the underlying structural and policy changes driving them.  To 
study this requires that they be analyzed within the context of a consistently specified growth model.  
This is important, not only to understand the relationship between them, but also in devising 
appropriate policy responses. 
In this paper we have developed a small canonical model, extending the basic AK growth 
                                                 
18 From the equilibrium conditions (20), for infinitesimal changes we can formally establish the relationships: 
() 0
dA dd ρψ <   () () dd dd dd
β γ ρψ ρψ <= . 
  22model with endogenous labor supply to agents having heterogeneous initial endowments of capital.  
The key mechanism whereby this initial distribution of capital endowments influences the 
distribution of income is through their differential wealth effects, and their impact on labor supply.  
If capital endowments are more unequally distributed than labor endowments, any structural change 
that tends to increase the supply of labor and raise the relative return to capital, raises the return of 
the factor that is the source of the inequality, and the distribution of income becomes more unequal.  
This will tend to induce a positive relationship between inequality and growth.  Indeed our model 
tends to support such a positive relationship in the sense that it almost always emerges in the case of 
independent structural changes.   
Our results contrast with the literature that has found that greater inequality results in slower 
growth. It is important to emphasize the two crucial differences between previous work and our 
approach.  First, earlier work has focused on the effect of wealth inequality on growth. In contrast, 
we have chosen a framework in which the distribution of wealth has no impact on growth, and 
examined the determinants of the distribution of income. This means that the two mechanisms are 
not mutually exclusive, and could well be in operation simultaneously. Second, we have emphasized 
the simultaneous determination of growth and personal incomes, rather than the effect of initial 
wealth on subsequent growth. This difference can explain why earlier empirical work which 
regressed long-run growth rates on initial income inequality (a proxy for wealth inequality) found a 
negative impact, while more recent studies which considered the short-term effect obtained a 
positive correlation.  
Finally, we conclude with a caveat.  While the simple AK model has the advantage of 
providing a tractable framework for investigating the growth-inequality relationship and its policy 
implications, it also has the limitation that the economy is always on its balanced growth path.  It 
therefore cannot address issues pertaining to the dynamics of wealth and income distribution.  This is 
an important subject for further work.  The analysis of this paper suggests that applying the present 
approach to the Ramsey model with its transitional dynamics, is not only important in its own right, 
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0.727  2.334  19.946  32.88  -- -- -- -- 
50% increase in A 
from 0.60 to 0.90 
0.724 4.211  20.990  33.52 1.877 1.044 0.556  0.64 
50% increase in 
IES from 1/3 to 1/2 

















50% increase in η 
from 1.75 to 2.625 
0.802  1.695 16.439 30.71 -0.639 -3.507 5.488  -2.17 
50% decrease in β  
from 0.04 to 0.02 
0.722 3.044  21.506  33.84 0.710 1.560 2.197  0.96 
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A.1 Conditions  for    () 0 Gl ′ >
Taking the derivative of   yields  () Gl
(1 ) ( ) 1
() ( )1 ( )
1
lf L l
Gl f L f L
γ ηη
′′ ⎛⎞ − ′′ =+ + − ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
′ ′      (A.1) 
Now for a production function of the form (1a), the elasticity of substitution, σ ,can be expressed as  
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We define labor’s share of output by 
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Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1), yields 
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The transversality condition (17b) implies  (1 ) ll η − > , and given our restriction  0 γ < , the right 
hand side of (A.5) is positive, establishing  () 0 Gl ′ > , as asserted. 
A.2  Conditions for a balanced growth path  
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so that both the (PP) and (RR) have negative slopes.  Also 
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Under weak conditions (A.6b) can both be shown to be negative, so that both the RR and PP 
curves are concave.  To establish these conditions, we shall focus on the case of a constant elasticity 
of substitution production function, in which σ  is constant.  Differentiating (A.3) with respect to L, 
we obtain 
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Both (A.7a) and (A.7b) will be negative under weak conditions.  For example, 









         ( A . 8 )  
which is necessary and sufficient for (A.7a) to be negative, is also sufficient for (A.7b) to be 
negative as well.  This clearly holds for the Cobb-Douglas production function, and assuming   to 
be around 0.6, it requires 
W s
0.33 σ > , which is a weak condition.   
Thus concavity can be reasonably assumed, and given concavity, sufficient condition to 
ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium are: (i) ψ PP(l =0) >ψ RR(l =0), so that the (PP) 
schedule lies above the (RR) curve at  0 l = , and (ii) the (PP) schedule is steeper at each point than is 
the RR schedule.. In this case, the (PP) schedule lies below (RR) for l =1, and the two schedules 
only cross once.  Condition (i) is satisfied when 
   (1) (1) 0 ff γ β ′ −++ > ,       (A.9) 
while condition (ii) will be met if and only if the stability condition  () 0 Gl ′ >  is met.  Both of these 
are very weak conditions and will certainly hold if  0 γ < , as we are assuming. 
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